In this paper, using timber sale auctions in Oregon, we study the merger e¤ects within a general framework where bidders are heterogeneous and entry is endogenous.
Introduction
Incentive to merger and merger e¤ects have long been of public policy interest and drawn much attention in the industrial organization literature. Most of the work in this area has adopted the traditional Nash-Cournot model allowing …rms to have heterogeneous capacities. For theoretical contributions, see Farrell and Shapiro (1990) , Perry and Porter (1985) , among others; for empirical work, see Pesendorfer (2003) . Merger in auctions could have profound public policy implications as auctions have long been used as a means for price determination under a competitive setting and an incomplete information environment, and also because of its relevance to collusion.
Asymmetry is an essential part of any merger analysis in auctions, as even with originally symmetric bidders, once there is a merger among bidders, the post-merger bidders become asymmetric. As a result, to conduct meaningful merger analysis in auctions, asymmetric game-theoretic auction models need to be used. This complicates the merger analysis in a …rst-price setting because even within the independent private value (IPV) paradigm, there is no closed-form expression for the Nash-Bayesian equilibrium. As a result, most of the work in studying merger e¤ects in auctions has focused on either open auctions or second price auctions where the dominant strategy is to bid bidder's value or/and with some special value distributions that would make the analysis tractable or make simulation of bidding strategy possible. See, e.g., Thomas (1998) , Waehrer and Perry (2000) , Brannman and Froeb (2000) , among others. Also Waehrer (1999) studies merger e¤ects in …rst-price and open auction mechanisms within the IPV framework under the assumption that the merged bidders'value distributions can be ranked because of the size of merged groups. Another related strand of the literature is on collusion and bid rigging problems. 1 In this paper, using timber sale auctions organized by the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), we study the merger e¤ects within a general framework where bidders are heterogeneous and entry is endogenous. That we consider heterogeneous bidders is motivated by the evidence from the previous work studying the timber auctions in Oregon that hauling distance plays an important role in bidders'bidding (Brannman and Froeb (2000) ) and entry (Li and Zhang (2010) ) decisions. This means that bidders are asymmetric. Also, all the previous work in studying merger e¤ects in auctions has assumed no endogenous entry. However, the recent empirical work in auctions in general and in timber auctions in particular (e.g. Athey, Levin and Seira (2011), Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) , Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Zheng (2009, 2012) , Roberts and Sweeting (2010) ) has demonstrated that bidders'participation and entry decision is an integrated part of the decision making process that has to be taken into account when studying auctions. Furthermore, Li and Zhang (2010) …nd a small but strongly signi…cant level of a¢ liation among potential bidders'private information (either private values or entry costs). In view of these, in this paper we attempt to study merger e¤ects in the timber auctions organized by the ODF within a general framework in which potential bidders are a¢ liated and heterogeneous, and they make entry decisions before submitting bids.
We develop an entry and bidding model for asymmetric bidders within the APV paradigm. On the theoretical front, we extend the results by Lebrun (1999 Lebrun ( , 2006 for the IPV case with asymmetric bidders and without entry to our case and establish existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium and existence of the entry equilibrium for a general class of joint distribution of a¢ liated private values.
Because of the general framework we adopt, the merger e¤ects are the results of the interactions of a¢ liation, entry, and asymmetry, as well as competition. While the e¤ect of the number of potential bidders on winning bids and seller's revenue is clear in an IPV model with symmetric bidders and without entry, it becomes less clear in a more general setting, such as the IPV model with entry and symmetric bidders Zheng (2009, 2012) ), and the APV model without entry (Pinkse and Tan (2005) ). In particular, Zheng (2009, 2012) show that in terms of the relationship between the number of potential bidders and the seller's expected revenue, in addition to the usual "competition e¤ect,"there is an opposite e¤ect due to the entry which they term as the "entry e¤ect."On the other hand, Pinkse and Tan (2005) postulate that in a conditionally independent private value model, a special case of the APV paradigm, in addition to the "competition e¤ect," there is an opposite e¤ect caused by a¢ liation they term as the "a¢ liation e¤ect." Zhang (2008) shows that in the APV model with entry and symmetric bidders, these three e¤ects, namely, the "competition e¤ect," the "entry e¤ect," and the "a¢ liation e¤ect" are at work. While we expect these three e¤ects to remain in the APV framework with entry and asymmetric bidders, it becomes challenging to pinpoint them with asymmetric bidders. Since the e¤ect of merger is closely related to how the auction outcome of interest changes with the set of potential bidders, i.e, not only the number of potential bidders, but also the identity of potential bidders when they are heterogeneous, and at the same time, theory does not yield good predictions, we rely on the structural analysis to gain insight on this issue.
We develop a structural framework to estimate the entry and bidding model we propose. 2 Because of the complexity of the model, and in particular, because there is no closed form so-lution for the bidding function, we have to rely on some numerical approximation procedure. Moreover, while the structural analysis of auctions with asymmetric bidders has focused on the case with two types of bidders (Athey, Levin and Seira (2011), Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2003) , and Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2011)) motivated by institutional features of the environment, our model allows for all potential bidders to be di¤erent from each other, motivated by the fact that in our data, asymmetry is driven by the di¤erence among bidders' hauling distances. To overcome the di¢ culty and complication arising from the structural approach, we adopt the copula approach in modeing the joint distribution of private values and the joint distribution of entry costs. The copula modeling approach, which is to model the joint distribution based on the marginal distributions, has several considerable advantages in our setting. First, within the class of Archimedean copulas, we estbalish existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium. Second, by using Clayton copulas to model both the joint distribution of private values and the joint distribution of entry costs, a¢ liation assumption is imposed. Third, the copula approach makes the structural estimation of entry and bidding models more tractable. Lastly, it enables us to conduct counterfactutal analysis of merger e¤ects, as the dependence parameter remains unchanged after merger. The study of merger e¤ects is conducted through a set of counterfactual analyses using the estimated structural parameters. We consider two hypothetical mergers, one between the two most competitive …rms, and one between the two least competitive …rms, so as to gain insight on the merger e¤ects on the seller's revenue, the bidders'welfare, and also on the allocation e¢ ciency. In both cases, we try to quantify the merger e¤ects that could be attributed to entry, a¢ liation or auction mechanism (…rst-price auction versus open auction). This paper makes contribution to the growing literature of the structural analysis of auction data since Paarsch (1992) . 3 While the structural approach has been extended to the APV paradigm by Vuong (2000, 2002) , Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2003) , and Hubbard, Li and Paarsch (2009), this paper is the …rst one in estimating a structural model within the APV paradigm and taking into account entry. Also, while the recent work has started to pay attention to the problem of participation and entry, all the work has focused on the IPV framework with Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) being an exception as they consider a common value (CV) model. 4 In contrast, this paper considers the entry problem within the APV paradigm, a more general framework. It is worth noting that from a modeling perspective, our focus is on a¢ liation, which can be viewed as positive dependence among bidders' private information arising from some auction-speci…c common component that is unobserved by the bidders, such as future weather condition in the region among others when timber auctions are concerned. On the other hand, there has been recent interest in modeling unobserved auction heterogeneity (e.g. Athey, Levin and Seira (2011), Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Li and Zheng (2009) , and Roberts and Sweeting (2010)), which is auction-speci…c common component that is observed by the bidders but not observed by the econometrician. While both of these modeling approaches can have similar implications on observables such as resulting in dependence among bids (conditional on the auction heterogeneity observed by the econometrician), the information environment between the two is di¤erent, leading to di¤erent behavioral implications. Speci…cally, the bidders'values in the latter framework in controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity are independent conditional on the information set based on which they draw their values. Such information set can contain auction heterogeneity both observed and unobserved to the econometrician. The a¢ liated private value model we adopt assumes that even after conditioning on such information set, the bidders' values are still a¢ liated; we also allow for unobserved auction heterogeneity from an econometric viewpoint. While focusing on assessing merger e¤ects, our empirical analysis of timber auctions and the resulting …ndings also o¤er new insight on timber sale auctions and policy related issues. Most of the empirical analysis of timber sale auctions is based on the IPV model without entry (e.g. Paarsch (1997) ; ours is based on the APV model with entry and heterogeneous bidders. As a result, our …ndings can be more robust, and also can be more useful for addressing the policy-related issues as our analysis takes into account the a¢ liation e¤ect, the entry e¤ect, and the asymmetry e¤ect. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data we analyze in the paper. In Section 3 we propose the asymmetric APV model with entry. Section 4 is devoted to the structural analysis of the data, and Section 5 conducts a set of counterfactual analyses studying the merger e¤ects.
Data
The data we study in this paper are from the timber auctions organized by the ODF between January 2002 and June 2007. Before an auction is advertised, the ODF "cruises"the selected tract of timber and obtains information of the tract, such as the composition of the species, the quality grade of the timber and so on. Based on the information it obtains, the ODF sets its appraised price for the tract, which serves also as the reserve price. After the "cruise," a detailed bid notice is usually released 4-6 weeks prior to the sale date, which provides information about the auction, including the date and location of the sale, species volume, quality grade of the timber, appraised price as well as other related information. Potential bidders acquire their own information or private values through di¤erent ways and decide whether and how much to bid. Bids are submitted in sealed envelopes that are opened at a bid opening session at the ODF district o¢ ce o¤ering the sale. The sale is awarded to the bidder with the highest bid. All the sales are therefore …rst price sealed bid scale auctions.
The original data contain 415 sales in total. Among them, some sales have more than one bid species, which are deleted from our sample because of the "skewed bidding" issue discussed in Athey and Levin (2001) . We focus on the sales in which Douglas-…r is the only bid species and drop the sales with other than Douglas-…r as bid species, because Douglas-…r is a majority species. Considering the time that our estimation program could take, we focus on the auctions with at most 8 potential bidders. The resulting …nal sample has 203 sales and 1074 observed bids.
For each sale, we directly observe some sale-speci…c variables including the location and the region of the sale, appraised price, appraised volume measured in thousand board feet or MBF, length of the contract, and trunk diameter as well. Noting that the bid species is often a combination of a mixture of several grades of quality, we use number 1, 2, , up to 18 to denote the letter-grades used by ODF so that the …nal grade of a sale is the weighted average of grades with volumes of grades as the weight. In addition to sale-speci…c variables, as shown in Brannman and Froeb (2000) and Li and Zhang (2010) , hauling distance is an important bidder-speci…c variable that a¤ects bidders'bidding and entry decisions. However, hauling distance is not observed directly. We use the hauling distance variable constructed in Li and Zhang (2010) who convert the location of a tract into latitude and longitude through the Oregon Latitude and Longitude Locator and …nd the distances between the tract and the mills of …rms by using Google Map. 5 The key information related to entry is the identities of potential bidders, which are not observed. Unlike some procurement auctions, where information on bidders who have requested bidding proposal is available and can be used as a proxy for potential bidders (Li and Zheng (2009)), we do not have such information in our case, as is usual for timber sale auctions. Therefore we follow Athey, Levin and Seira (2011) and Li and Zheng (2012) to construct potential bidders. Speci…cally, we …rst divide all sales in the original data set into 146 groups each of which contains all sales held in the same district in the same quarter of the same year. The union of all observed bidders in one group form the set of potential bidders for all sales in that group. In other words, all auctions in the same group have the same set of potential bidders. 6 Note that in constructing the potential bidders we use the original data set including all auctions removed from our …nal sample. Summary statistics of the data are given in Table 1 . Notably, the entry proportion, which is calculated as the ratio of the number of actual bidders and the number of potential bidders, is about 0.66 on average, meaning that while there is strong evidence of entry pattern from the potential bidders, on average more than half of the potential bidders would participate in the auction.
The Model
In this section we propose a two-stage game-theoretic model to characterize the timber sales, extending the models in Athey, Levin and Seira (2011) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) with two groups of bidders within an IPV paradigm to the APV paradigm that allows potential bidders to be di¤erent from each other. Speci…cally, motivated by the …nding of Brannman and Froeb (2000) that the hauling distance plays a signi…cant role in bidders' bidding decision in oral timber auctions in Oregon, and the …nding of Li and Zhang (2010) using the same data studied in this paper that the hauling distance is important in potential bidders'entry decision and potential bidders are a¢ liated through their private information (either private values or entry costs), we consider a …rst-price sealed-bid auction within the APV paradigm with asymmetric bidders.
In the model, a single object is auctioned o¤ to N heterogeneous and risk-neutral potential bidders, who are a¢ liated in their private information. For each auction, a reserve price, r, is announced prior to the letting. Bidder i has private entry cost k i ; including the cost of obtaining private information and bid preparation, and does not obtain his private value v i until after he decides to participate in the auction. We allow private values to be a¢ liated across bidders, and entry costs to be a¢ liated as well, that is v 1 ; : : : ; v N jointly follow a distribution F ( ; : : : ; ) with support [v; v] N , and k 1 ; : : : ; k N jointly follow a distribution G ( ; : : : ; ) with support k; k N . It is assumed that the lower support v is a bit smaller than the reserve price, e.g. v = r "; where " is a small positive number. We make this assumption in order to guarantee the uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium, which is discussed later in equilibrium characterization. Morover, we assume that each bidder's entry cost and private value are independent. 7 A¢ liation is a concept describing the positive dependence among random variables, which was …rst introduced into the study of auctions by Milgrom and Weber (1982) . 8 Intuitively, a¢ liation means that large values for some of the components in Z make other components more likely to be large than small. We also denote the marginal distribution and density of bidder i's private value by F i ( ) and f i ( ) and marginal distribution and density of bidder i's entry cost by G i ( ) and g i ( ), respectively, and assume that f i ( ) is continuously di¤erentiable and bounded away from zero on
The subscript of distribution function implies that all potential bidders are of di¤erent types due to the di¤erent hauling distances.
Bidding Strategy
Because the entry decision of a bidder, say bidder i, is based on his pre-entry expected pro…t, which depends on his bidding strategy, we …rst describe the bidding strategy of bidder i. As in Athey, Levin and Seira (2011) and Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2011), we assume that bidder i knows the number and the identity of active competitors in the bidding stage, 9 and thus bidder i's bidding strategy is determined by the …rst order condition of the following maximization problem,
where B j denotes the maximum bid among other active bidders 10 and Because of the general asymmetry we allow and the a¢ liated model as well as the …rst price mechanism we consider, taking into account the selection e¤ect is challenging as it is more involved in terms of establishing existence and uniqueness of bidding equilibrium and econometric implementation. 8 It is equivalent to the concept of multivariate total positivity of order 2 (MTP 2 ) in the multivariate statistics literature. 9 This assumption could be reasonable for markets where participants have more accurate prior information on the number/identity of competitors such as timber auctions (Athey, Levin and Sera (2011)) or procurement auctions (Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2011)). See Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2011) for more discussion on this assumption. 10 Active bidders are those who participate in the auction, but do not necessarily submit bids, as their private values could be below the reserve price. Actual bidders are those who submit bids. In the data we only observe actual bidders. Since in our data the probability that the private value is below the reserve price is very small, we assume that the reserve price exceeds the lower support v by a small value. Therefore the set of active bidders and the set of actual bidders are almost identical. a i by n a i . As usual we consider a continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing bidding strategy, b i = s i (v i ). Therefore the …rst order condition is
where F V i jv i denotes the joint distribution of V j ; j 6 = i conditional on V i = v i and s 1 i ( ) is the inverse function of the bidding function of bidder i: A set of equations (1) with boundary conditions s 1 i (v) = v for i = 1; : : : ; n form a system of di¤erential equations characterizing the equilibrium bids for all n active bidders.
Entry Decision
In the initial participation stage, each potential bidder i only knows his own entry cost, joint distributions of entry costs and private values. Therefore the entry decision of bidder i is determined by his pre-entry expected pro…t from participation, i : Speci…cally, he participates in the auction only if his entry cost is less then i : The ex ante expected pro…t i is given by
where Pr (a i ja i = 1) is a function of p i ; i = 1; : : : ; N , where p i is bidder i's entry probability. As a result, the pre-entry expected pro…t is the sum of 2 N 1 products of the post-entry pro…ts and corresponding probabilities with the unknown private value integrated out. On the other hand, in equilibrium the entry probabilities are given by
Note that although the number of potential bidders does not directly a¤ect the bidding strategy in the bidding stage, it a¤ects the number and the identities of active bidders, which in turn have impact on the bidding strategy.
Characterization of the Equilibrium
Existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium with asymmetric bidders has been a challenging problem studied in the recent auction theory literature. See, e.g. Lebrun (1999 Lebrun ( , 2006 and Riley (2000, 2003) within the IPV framework, Lizzeri and Persico (2000) within the APV framework and two types of bidders, and Reny and Zamir (2004) within the a¢ liated value framework and with asymmetric bidders. The analysis of our model is further complicated by the introduction of a¢ liation and entry, as well as that we allow all potential bidders to be di¤erent from each other. To address the issue of existence and uniqueness in our case, we use the theory of ordinary di¤erential equations (ODE). As is well known, the common ODE takes the following form, y 0 = h(y; x). As the …rst order condition, equation (1) does not present that form explicitly for any general copulas, we look at the case where the joint distribution of bidders' private values is characterized by the family of Archimedean copulas, which simpli…es the …rst order conditions to the common form of ODE. For the copula concept and the characterization of the Archimedean copulas, see Nelsen (1999) . The copula approach can provide a ‡exible way of modeling joint dependence of multivariate variables using the marginal distributions. Speci…cally, by Sklar's theorem (Sklar (1973) ), for a joint distribution F (x 1 ; : : : ; x N ) ; there is a unique copula C; such that C (F 1 (x 1 ) ; : : : ; F N (x N )) = F (x 1 ; : : : ; x N ) ; where F i ( ) is the marginal distribution of X i : For the Archimedean copulas, the copula C can be expressed as C (u 1 ; : : :
where is a generator of the copula and is a decreasing and convex function from 
: : : ; x N ), thus the …rst order condition (1) determining the equilibrium bids can therefore be written as follows
Note that with the copula speci…cation for the joint entry cost distribution, the entry probabilities in (2) can be expressed in terms of the joint entry cost distribution. For example, the probability that bidder 1 up to bidder i 1 participate in the auction while bidder i + 1 up to bidder N do not, given the participation of bidder i, Pr (a i ; p 1 ; : : : ; p N ja i = 1) ; can be expressed as follows,
where 
Pr (a i = 1) = C k (1; : : : ; 1; p i ; 1; : : : ; 1; q k ) ; and C k denotes the copula for the entry cost.
Equilibrium of the model consists of two parts, entry equilibrium and bidding equilibrium. Based on the choice of Archimedean copulas for the joint distribution of private values, existence of the equilibrium can be established. Moreover, with some additional conditions, the bidding equilibrium is unique. The next proposition describes the equilibrium formally. 
Proposition (Characterization of Equilibrium
for some .
ii. Uniqueness of Bidding Equilibrium Moreover, if F i (r) > 0 and
is bounded and increasing in u, then the bidding equilibrium is unique.
iii. Entry Equilibrium In the entry equilibrium, bidder i chooses to participate in the auction if his entry cost is less than the threshold i (p) and stay out otherwise, where p = (p 1 ; : : : p N ) and p i is the entry probability of bidder i and is determined by
It can be easily shown that our model meets Assumptions A.1 and A.2 in Reny and Zamir (2004) and the existence of a monotone pure-strategy bidding equilibrium follows Theroem 2.1 in the same paper. We then need to prove that in such bidding equilibrium, at the upper bound of private value, bidders share the same bid, that is the existence of in the second boundary condition, equation (6) . The proof is provided in the …rst part of Appendix A. To show the uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium is to show that there is a unique < v such that s The condition that 0 (u)= 00 (u) is increasing in u is needed in the proof, and can be readily veri…ed that it is implied by the a¢ liation condition given in Müller and Scarsini (2005) .
As is seen here, existence of the entry equilibrium is equivalent to existence of the entry probability p i ; given by the equation (7) (7) ; according to Brouwer's …xed point theorem. The formal proofs are provided in Appendix A. There could be more than one set of p satisfying equation (7), which raises the possibility of multiple equilibria. Following Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2011), we verify the uniqueness of the entry equilibrium within the estimation routine by trying di¤erent initial values to see whether we obtain similar results.
The Structural Analysis
We estimate the model proposed in the last section using the timber sales data. Our objective is to recover the underlying joint distributions of private values and entry costs using observed bids and the number of actual bidders. The structural inference in our case is complicated because of the generality of our model that accounts for a¢ liation, asymmetry, and entry. Our approach circumvents the complications arising from the estimation of our model and makes the structural inference tractable. First, to model the a¢ liation in a ‡exible way, we adopt the copula approach in modeling the joint distribution of private values and the joint distribution of entry costs. 11 Second, since we allow bidders to be asymmetric, the system of di¤erential equations consisting of equation (3) that characterizes bidders'Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies does not yield closed-form solutions. To address this problem we adopt a numerical method based on Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994) and Gayle (2004) . Third, because of the various covariates we try to control for and the relatively small size of the data set, the nonparametric/semiparametric method does not work well here. 12 Therefore, we adopt a fully parametric approach.
Speci…cations
We use the Clayton copula to model the joint distributions of both private values and entry costs. With the generator of Clayton copula given above, the joint distribution of private value is speci…ed as F (v 1 ; : : :
; and the joint distribution of entry costs is speci…ed as G (k 1 ; : : : ;
where q v and q k are dependence parameters and F i and G i are the marginal distributions of private value and entry cost, respectively. The F i is speci…ed as a truncated exponential distribution
and G i is also assumed to be exponential but without truncation G K`i (kjx`i; ) = 1 exp
k for bidder i of the`-th auction,`= 1; : : : ; L; where L is the number of auctions, v`i and k`i are the parameters in both exponential distribution and equal exp ( x`i) and exp ( x`i), respectively, and x`i is a vector of covariates that are auction speci…c or bidder speci…c, which, in our case, includes variables such as hauling distance, volume, duration, grade, and trunk diameter. 13 Auction speci…c covariates are used to control heterogeneity of auctions and the hauling distance is used to capture asymmetry among bidders. The truncated speci…cation of the marginal distribution of private value makes the numerical method adopted to solve the equilibrium bids possible. 14 In practice, v is assumed to be equal to $1000/MBF. We then model the joint distributions of private values and entry costs in auction`as Clayton copula with di¤erent dependence parameters q v and q k : The use of the Clayton copula o¤ers several advantages. First, it guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium as discussed in Section 3.3. Second, it preserves the same dependence structure when the number of potential bidders changes. Third, it is relatively easy to draw dependent data from the Clayton copula, as it has a closed form that can be used to draw data recursively. Note that in these speci…cations, the asymmetry across potential bidders is captured by the inclusion of the hauling distance variable in x`i, while both and are kept constant across di¤erent bidders. This enables us to estimate a relatively parsimonious structural model and at the same time control for the asymmetry among bidders. Li and Paarsch (2012) propose a semiparametric method in estimating the symmetric APV model without entry, which can be extended to our case. 13 Here we do not introduce unobserved auction heterogeneity into the model, as Li and Zhang (2010) show that it does not have a signi…cant e¤ect in bidders'entry behavior. 14 Here we need an upper bound for the private value to make the algorithm of …nding the equilibrium bids possible.
Estimation Method
Because of the complexity of our structural model, we employ the indirect inference method to estimate the model. Initially proposed in the nonlinear time series context by Smith (1993) and developed further by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) and Gallant and Tauchen (1996) , the indirect inference method is simulation based and obtains the estimates of parameters by minimizing a measure of distance between the estimates for the auxiliary parameters of an auxiliary model using the original data and simulated data. More speci…cally, let denote the vector of parameters of interest, be the parameters of the auxiliary model, b T and b ST ( ) be the estimates of the auxiliary model using the original data and the p-th simulated data out of P sets of simulated data from the model given a speci…c , respectively. Then the estimator of , denoted by b ST ; is de…ned as
where is a symmetric semi-positive de…nite matrix. Therefore to implement the indirect inference method, we have to draw data from the model for a given ; which involves calculating the equilibrium bids and the thresholds of the entry costs. We reply on a numerical approximation procedure, which is an extension of the methods in Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994) and Gayle (2004) to …nd the equilibrium bids; the algorithm to …nd the equilibrium bids is illustrated in detail in Appendix B. 15 We use an iteration procedure to …nd the equilibrium entry probabilities as described below. Speci…cally, we adopt a two-step indirect inference method. In the …rst step we apply the indirect inference method to the observed bids. The assumptions that the entry cost and private values are independent and that the active bidders know the number of the actual bidders at the time of bidding enable us to recover the distribution of private values with only the observed bids. With the estimated distribution of private values, we apply the indirect inference method again to the observed entry behavior in the second step and estimate the distribution of entry costs. One practical issue in the second step estimation is that we need to compute the equilibrium entry probabilities determined by equation (7) in order to evaluate the objective function in the indirect inference method. Therefore the second step estimation should include two loops, namely, the inner loop which is the one solving for the equilibrium entry probabilities, and the outer loop which is the one solving the optimization problem that is computationally intensive. To address this issue, we change the order of loops. Speci…cally, we …rst estimate the distribution of entry costs using the indirect inference together with any given entry probabilities. 16 With the estimated distribution, we then update the entry probabilities and estimate the distribution again. We repeat these two steps until the estimates and entry probabilities converge 17 .
The auxiliary model, which is usually simpler than the original model and easier to estimate as well, plays an important role in the indirect inference method. In this paper, following Li (2010) we employ a relatively simple and easy-to-estimate auxiliary model to make the implementation tractable and the inference feasible. Speci…cally, since we use the number of actual bidders and bids in the estimation of entry and bidding model, respectively, our auxiliary model includes two separate regressions: a linear regression of the observed bids and a Poisson regression of the number of actual bidders, which have the following speci…cations,
where b`is the average bid of auction`; and X`denote the vector of auction-speci…c covariates of auction`and the average of bidder-speci…c covariates. In practice, X`is a 6 1 vector including hauling distance, volume, duration of a contract, timber grade, trunk diameter, and the number of potential bidders, and m is chosen to be 2 which makes our model over-identi…ed. As is clear from the discussion above, the indirect inference method is computationally convenient in dealing with such complex two-stage entry and bidding models as in our case, because it relies on rountine estimation of the two auxiliary regression models and also simulation of the structural model from the trial values of the parameters, which is facilitated by our copula approach. An issue arising from the implementation of the second step indirect inference method is the discontinuity of the objective function of equation (8) because of the discrete dependent variable (the number of actual bidders) in the auxiliary model that makes gradient-based optimization algorithm invalid. We address this issue by using simplex, a nongradient-based algorithm. Alternatively, one can follow Keane and Smith (2003) to smooth the objective function using a logistic kernel. Table 2 reports the estimation results. For the (marginal) private value distribution, all the estimated parameters have the expected signs. Of particular interest is the parameter of the hauling distance variable, which is used to control for heterogeneity across bidders. It has a signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient, meaning that bidders are asymmetric and that the longer the hauling distance is, the less is the private value mean. Furthermore, the average marginal e¤ect of the hauling distance variable is about -0.512, meaning that one mile increase in the distance would reduce the private value mean by $0.512/MBF while everything else is …xed. Another parameter of particular interest is the dependence parameter q v in private values, which turns out to be relatively small (q v = 0:127) but signi…cant. To get some idea of how large the dependence is with q v = 0:127; we use a measure called Kendall's (Nelsen (1999) ), which lies between [ 1; 1] and is used to measure the concordance of two random variables. Concordance is not really the same concept as a¢ liation, but measures the positive dependence in a similar way. Kendall's is de…ned as the probability of concordance minus the probability of discordance:
Estimation Results
For the Clayton copula with two random variables, = q=(q + 2) = 0:060: Therefore q v = 0:127 implies that the event of any two bidders' private values being concordant is about 6.0% more likely than the event of being discordant.
Two points regarding the estimates in the distribution of entry costs are worth noting. First, the hauling distance variable is signi…cant and positive in the entry cost distribution and its marginal e¤ect is 0.699. Second, the dependence level among the entry costs is 0.534, implying a Kendall's of 0.21 in the two bidders case, much higher than implied in the distribution of private values. This indicates that the a¢ liation among the entry behaviors is mainly driven by the a¢ liation among the entry costs.
Counterfactual Analyses of Merger E¤ects
With the estimated structural parameters we can exploit the rich environment of our model to study merger e¤ects through counterfactual analysis. Speci…cally, we will assess the merger e¤ects on the winning bid (thus the seller's welfare), on bidders'welfare, and on allocation e¢ ciency.
As discussed previously, the literature on merger e¤ects in auctions has been limited, and mainly focused on studying predictions from theory within the IPV framework without taking entry into account. In this paper we attempt to broaden the scope by studying merger e¤ects within the APV framework taking both entry and bidders'asymmetry into account. In particular, we compare the merger e¤ects in our model with auctions within the IPV paradigm, with open auctions, and with auctions without entry. These could shed light on how these assumptions interact with merger. Comparing the APV model with entry with the IPV model with entry would o¤er insight on how a-iation e¤ect could come into play in the …nal merger e¤ect; looking into the di¤erence of merger e¤ects in …rst-price auctions with entry and open auctions with entry both within the APV paradigm can indicate how merger e¤ects could di¤er between the two mechanisms, and which one may be more susceptible to exercise of market power; lastly how entry a¤ects mergers is studied by comparing the APV model with entry and without entry.
For all the e¤ects discussed below, we consider two types of mergers: "best merger," a merger of two bidders with the longest hauling distance and "worst merger,"a merger of two bidders with the shortest hauling distance. "Worst"and "best"refer to whether the merger increases or decreases competition among bidders. Intuitively, "worst merger"creates a new bidder who has the largest private value distribution that dominates other bidders, which discourages competition while "best merger" creates a bidder with a relative larger private value distrubution than the distribution pre-merger which could make other bidders more aggressive. 19 Therefore, these two types of extreme mergers can provide a range that bounds the e¤ects of any other merger. Note that the merger considered in this paper is assumed to be exogenous. Assuming that bidder 1 and bidder 2 merge without loss of generality and the merged bidder is denoted by bidder m: The private value V m is de…ned as V m = max (V 1 ; V 2 ).
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Similarly, the entry cost K m of the merged bidder is de…ned as K m = min (K 1 ; K 2 ). Therefore 19 Of course this is not all that merger brings to competition. Both types of merger change the number of bidders, which is another main source of competition in the market. In this sense, the names may not precisely describe the e¤ect on competition. 20 Note that most of the work on mergers models mergers in this way. See, e.g., Waehrer (1999) 
; q k ) in terms of copula, where e C is the survival copula associated with C: It can be easily shown that the dependence (a¢ liation) parameters remain the same after merger.
We conduct counterfactual analyses on 169 auctions whose numbers of potential bidders are no more than 7. Within each paradigm, we report 25% percentile, median, and 75% percentile for the e¤ects on each outcome. We simulate 1000 auctions based on covariates of each auction and conduct "best"and "worst"mergers for these 1000 auctions and compare the pre-merger and post-merger end outcomes. The results are summarized in Table 3 : In the table, the change in the winning bid is listed as percentage change and the change in the bidders'payo¤ is listed as absolute change, as the payo¤ before merger could be negative and the percentage change makes no sense in this case. The change in the allocation e¢ ciency in the table is the percentage point change.
Merger E¤ects on the Seller' s Welfare
The seller's welfare is essentially the winning bid if the auction is successful and the seller's value is assumed to be zero. As is shown in Table 3 ; in the "worst merger"case the merger lowers the expected winning bid in all types of auctions, while the "best merger"raises it on average. This is also the case in terms of the most 25 percentiles, medians and 75 percentiles. Most percentiles in the "worst merger"case are negative while they are positive in the "best merger" case. Speci…cally, for the auction within the APV framework that we study in this paper, the "worst merger"lowers the winning bid by 4.3% and the "best merger"generates a 2.44% increase in the winning bid on average. It is interesting to note that these results indicate that while the seller would be worse o¤ with the "worst merger," he may bene…t from the "best merger." 21 The auction without entry has the smallest change in the winning bid after both types of mergers. This implies that the interaction between entry and mergers reinforces the merger e¤ect on the winning bid. The open auction sees the largest reduction, 10.64% in the winning bid caused by the "worst merger." Also, comparison between the results from the APV models with and without entry reveals that the seller's revenue could be worse o¤ in the case with entry than in the case without entry.
In the open auction, the expected winning bid is equal to the second highest private value and the "worst merger" makes the third highest private value becoming the second highest one after merger, therefore 10.64% reduction suggests the di¤erence in the expected value of the second and third highest private values. For the "best merger," the auction within the IPV paradigm has the largest increase, 3.32%. The "best merger" combines two least competitive bidders into one relatively strong bidder and thus makes other bidders more aggressive in bidding. Within the IPV paradigm, there is no "a¢ liation e¤ect," therefore the "best merger"(the "worst merger") raises (lowers) the winning bid more than it does in the auction with a¢ liation.
Merger E¤ects on Bidders'Welfare
To study the merger e¤ects on bidders' welfare, we consider the internal welfare, namely the welfare of the merging bidders, and the external welfare, the welfare of the non-merging bidders, in a way similar to Farrell and Shapiro (1990) who study horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly model. If the merger is considered endogenous, the change in the internal welfare has to be non negative. In this paper, the merger is assumed to be exogenous, therefore the change in the internal welfare could be negative. A winning bidder's welfare is de…ned as the di¤erence between the private value and the winning bid minus the entry cost, while the welfare of a non-winning bidder is equal to the negative entry cost, if he participates in the auction, and zero if he does not. Note that for each scenario, the internal welfare and external welfare in the pre-merger cases are di¤erent for two types of mergers, as the merging and non-merging bidders are di¤erent in both types of mergers.
The merger a¤ects the bidders'payo¤ through several channels. On one hand, the merger creates a stronger bidder compared with the two merging bidders. After the "worst merger" the merged bidder has more monopoly power, while in the "best merger"the merged bidder has larger probability of winning. From this perspective, the merging bidders should bene…t from both types of mergers. On the other hand, a stronger bidder makes other bidders more aggressive and bid more than they would without merger. This would lower the payo¤ of the merging bidders. This e¤ect is less important in the "best merger," since the two merging bidders were the least competitive bidders. Mergers could also a¤ect the entry behavior and thus the number of actual bidders. The change in the number of actual bidders might have an ambiguous e¤ect on the bids due to the "a¢ liation e¤ect" and the "entry e¤ect." The …nal e¤ect on bidders'payo¤ depends on the relative magnitudes of these e¤ects.
On internal welfare, in our model it decreases in the "worst merger"case and increases in the "best merger"case. For the IPV model with entry and for the open auction with entry, it increases in both "worst meger" case and "best merger" case. However, it decreases in both cases with the APV model without entry.
On external welfare, in both our model and the IPV model with entry, the "worst merger" increases the external welfare while the "best merger" decreases it; the precentage increase in the "worst meger" case in our model is more than in the IPV case, and the percentage decrease in the "best merger" case in our model is less than in the IPV case, meaning that the a¢ liation e¤ect could make the merger e¤ect on external welfare more positive.
It is also worth noting that for internal welfare, which is the payo¤ for the merging bidders, the "worst merger" case yields a reduction in the …rst-price auction case while it leads to an increase in the open auction case. On the other hand, for the "best merger" case, the internal welfare increases in both …rst-price auction case and the open auction case; however, the increase in the fomer is less than that in the latter. These …ndings imply that in such a general setting as the a¢ lated private value model with entry considered here, …rst-price auctions are likely to be less susceptible to the exercise of market power than open auctions, which have been found in the IPV case without entry (Robinson (1985) , Waeher (1999), among others.)
E¤ect on Allocation E¢ ciency
An auction is e¢ cient if the bidder with the highest private value wins the auction. The e¢ ciency is always achieved in auctions with symmetric bidders. When the bidders are asymmetric, there could be some loss in the allocation e¢ ciency. This subsection examines how two types of mergers a¤ect the e¢ ciency within the four types of auctions. First, there is no e¢ ciency loss in the open auction, as bidders bid their private values. Second, as is shown in Table 3 ; in all other three types of auctions, the merger e¤ect on e¢ ciency is negative, and more negative in the "worst merger" case than in the "best merger" case. The "worst merger" results in a more dominant bidder, leading to a higher level of asymmetry which possibly lower e¢ ciency; the "best merger" makes two merging least competitive bidders having larger probability of winning, leading to e¢ ciency loss. In both cases, it is worth noting that the e¢ ciency loss is less in the APV model with entry than in the IPV model with entry, meaning that a¢ liation could possibly mitigate the e¢ ciency loss resulting from mergers.
Conclusion
In this paper we study merger e¤ects in timber sales auctions in Oregon. We develop an entry and bidding model with heterogeneous bidders within the APV framework, and establish existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We adopt the structural approach to obtain the estimates for the structural parameters in the bidders'private values distribution and entry costs distribution. We are able to quantify the extent to which the potential bidders'private values and entry costs are a¢ liated, respectively, and …nd that the a¢ liation among bidders'private information found in Li and Zhang (2010) is mainly driven by the a¢ liation among bidders'entry costs. We then use the structural estimates to conduct counterfactual analysis to study the merger e¤ects, and o¤er insight on how a¢ liation, asymmetry, and entry could a¤ect mergers from both the seller's and bidders'perspectives. We …nd that in some cases the seller may bene…t from mergers; …rst-price auctions are likely to be less susceptible to the exercise of market power than open auctions; mergers in …rst-price auctions could lead to e¢ ciency loss, the extent of which depends on the types of mergers; a¢ liation could possibly mitigate the e¢ ciency loss resulting from mergers.
To the best of our knowledge our paper is the …rst one that uses the structural approach to study the merger e¤ects based on a general model that allows (heterogeneous) bidders' values to be a¢ liated and also takes their entry decision into account. Because of the general setting we consider, the analysis of the merger e¤ects is complicated by the interactions of a¢ liation, asymmetry, and entry. The structural approach we propose o¤ers a promising way to disentangle these e¤ects through the counterfactual analysis in addressing policy-related issues such as the merger e¤ect.
The proof of Proposition adapts Lebrun (1999 Lebrun ( , 2006 . We …rst need the following lemma.
Lemma. Consider a continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing bidding strategy. Assume
is decreasing in u: If e > and e s 
We want to prove that g = max ( ; e ) : According to the de…nition of g; > g: Suppose that g > max ( ; e ) : By continuity, there exists i such that e s 
It is obvious that Pr (B i <
Since the joint distribution of private values follows Archimedean copulas, we have
and
since Pr (B j < 0 jv) = 1: But this is impossible because the optimal bid of bidder j at v is ; therefore we have F i s 1 i ( ) = 1 and 0 = :
(ii) Uniqueness of the Bidding Equilibrium Suppose that there exist two equilibria and thus two di¤erent values and e such that the respective solutions s : Thus, the di¤erence between these two logarithms increases as b decreases towards v: On the other hand, ln (Pr (v j < r; j 6 = ijv i )) is a …nite value since F j (r) > 0: Therefore for two solutions, ln Pr v j < s 1 j (b i ) ; j 6 = ijv i cannot both converge to the same …nite value as b decreases towards r: Therefore and e coincide and the equilibrium is unique.
(iii) Entry Equilibrium
The entry probability p i is determined by equation ( 
Appendix B: Solving Equilibrium Bids Equilibrium Bids
Note that with the choice of the Clayton copula, the …rst order condition given in equation there are two boundary conditions associated with the equilibrium. Note that it cannot be used here although the boundary condition at the lower bound of bids is known to us, since it causes the problem of singularity. Therefore we have to use the condition at the upper bound, which is unfortunately unknown to us. To address this problem we follow the method described in Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994) and Gayle (2004) to …nd the common …rst. Roughly speaking, it is to …nd an which generates the best equilibrium bids at point v according to the algorithm described above. For details see Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994) and Gayle (2004) . 
